Russian aggression brings EU and US closer on trade and technology in France. What happens afterwards?
Eusebio R. Sheffield
5 min read
Quickly becoming the premier forum for renewed transatlantic cooperation, the US-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) has much more to do in its second year.
At its inaugural meeting in Pittsburgh last year, the TTC set an ambitious agenda through ten thematic working groups. Since then, Russia’s war on Ukraine has shocked global commodity markets and limited supply chains for key resources and technologies. Moscow’s aggression and the transatlantic response to it reshaped much of the TTC’s focus at its second annual meeting earlier this week in Paris-Saclay, France, as a forum to coordinate the response. from the United States and the European Union (EU) to the fallout from the Russian war.
So what’s the next step? Experts from our Europe Center are there to break down the meeting, its US-EU joint statementand what it all means for the future of transatlantic technology and trade policy.
Access an expert reaction below:
The transatlantic alignment – and its limits – on display
The forty-eight-page juggernaut of a joint statement shows the growing determination of Washington and Brussels to reflect together on a wide range of technological developments and geopolitical challenges. It highlights areas where regulatory commonalities already exist and can be exploited.
For example, the Biden administration and the European Commission consider that improving the transparency and responsiveness of platforms is essential to combat illegal and harmful content. The new EU Digital Services Act and several legislative proposals to the US Congress follow this approach. But the United States will never be able to go as far as Europe in restricting harmful but legal speech because of the strong protections of free speech enshrined in the US Constitution. The working group 5 of the TTC will organize a workshop on this subject, which will not fail to show the limits of convergence.
Likewise, protecting human rights defenders from online threats and condemning internet shutdowns are goals the US and EU can easily agree on, especially in the shadow of Russia’s war in Ukraine. But they must tread carefully when it comes to what the joint statement describes as “arbitrary or unlawful” surveillance, concluding simply that surveillance practices must comply with international human rights law. Aligning these practices with international law is actually where the challenge lies, as the long saga of transatlantic data transfers has shown. Washington and Brussels seem close to yet another agreement on this subject, but outside the framework of the TTC.
—Kenneth ProppNonresident Senior Fellow at the Europe Center and former Legal Advisor to the US Mission to the European Union.
Adapting to Russian Aggression Today and Future Threats Tomorrow
Shaken by Russia’s war on Ukraine, the EU and US have used the instruments of the TTC to lock in a policy that will cut off Vladimir Putin’s Russia from its tech exports and access to critical technologies . The TTC meeting revealed that the two sides had mapped vulnerabilities in supply chains, including around semiconductors and rare-earth magnets, and removed forced labor from Xinjiang, China, from supply chains. supply of solar panels. On the latter, the next step will be to coordinate state aid to avoid subsidy wars for a finite number of chip players and ensure greater strategic interdependence. Perhaps that could even mean transatlantic consortia in research and development and chip design.
Going forward, the next phase of the TTC will be to move from the acute challenges posed by Russia to the chronic challenges of climate change and digital authoritarianism, primarily China. When it comes to climate change, the convergence of sourcing principles and carbon footprint measurement methodology is a good start. In China, the two sides appear to be converging on a long-term effort to tackle Beijing’s techno-commercialism beyond 5G to cloud computing, artificial intelligence (AI), smart city technology, 6G and quantum computing. The creation of a mechanism for sharing information on strategic standards, as promised in the joint statement, will help improve coordination on technology standards.
Finally, there is a growing awareness that a vision of democratic technological governance must be addressed to the countries of the South. Efforts to tackle misinformation and align connectivity infrastructure funding principles are a good start. But if the declaration’s mention of “like-minded” partners becomes shorthand for excluding countries of the South, it will probably be insufficient to consolidate an open and pluralistic digital international system.
—Tyson BarkerNonresident Senior Fellow at Europe Center and former Senior Advisor to the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs at the US State Department.
Beware of working groups
The Paris-Saclay meeting reaffirmed the TTC as the primary mechanism for discussion between the US and the EU on key technology and trade issues. While much of the joint statement focused on Russian aggression in Ukraine, the real value of the meeting lies in two other areas.
First, as the lengthy joint statement indicates, working groups are key to the success of the TTC. The focus on Ukraine is important, but the real meat is in the annexes prepared by the ten working groups. The deliverables described are far from revolutionary, but they represent solid progress in identifying opportunities for cooperation, including participation in international standards bodies, defining and measuring trustworthy AI, promoting internationally recognized labor rights and the establishment of transparency and early warning signals in vital areas. supply chains.
Second, the TTC working groups have brought together many US and European officials and experts representing multiple agencies. Many have had little regular engagement with the transatlantic agenda in the past, but now meet regularly via video – with encouragement from top political leaders – to explore potential areas of cooperation. This had specific advantages: The rapid organization of US and EU export controls on Russia was possible because Task Force 7 had already brought together key experts. The creation of a community of experts focused on cooperation between the United States and the EU is in itself a major achievement of the TTC.
—Frances BurwellDistinguished Fellow of the Europe Center and Principal of McLarty Associates.
Further reading
Image: US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and US Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo speak with French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian ahead of a dinner at the US-Business and Technology Council summit European Union in Paris, France, May 15, 2022. Photo by Kevin Lamarque/Reuters/Pool.
